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Chapter 11 Green Growth and Low Carbon Development in East Asia: 




As mentioned in this book’s introduction, Northeast Asian countries have been framing green 
growth and low-carbon development as a green industrial policy that is compatible with 
conventional export-led industrialization, with a special focus on renewable energy. Through this 
framing, they have hoped to garner multiple benefits: developing leading manufacturers in 
prominent industries around the world; increasing green jobs; enhancing the international 
competitiveness of their industries; reducing carbon emissions; and enhancing their energy security. 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and evaluates the Northeast Asian 
countries’ achievements and remaining challenges, with a special focus on energy and trade. Then it 




1.1 Development of renewable-energy industries 
China and South Korea have dramatically increased their production and export of green 
products. In Chapter 5, Ogura and Mori showed that the international trade of green products has 
increased steadily in Northeast Asia, reaching 10 percent of the total trade volume. In particular, 
exports of renewable energy technologies and products have risen dramatically. 
A remarkable increase can be seen in solar power as well. Chinese manufacturers of solar 
photovoltaics (PV) modules have capitalized on economies of scale to increase exports. When the 
Chinese government implemented a feed-in-tariff (FIT) for solar power in 2012, these 
manufacturers increased domestic supply, accounting for one-fourth of global supply in the same 
year (Table 11-1). The Korean company Hanhwa has become a first-tier manufacturer and 
increased its global market share since it took over the Chinese firm SolarOne and the German firm 
Q-Cells. Chinese manufacturers have also joined in the more profitable upstream market for 
polysilicon and silicon ingot (Table 11-2). 
 
<Table 11-1 and 11-2 around here> 
 
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have also increased production, and exports of wind 
turbines have increased to a lesser extent. Although Chinese state-owned manufacturers started 
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operation with the aim of rural electrification, they have rapidly acquired and increased production 
capacity since the Chinese government enacted the Renewable Energy Law, which implemented a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and mandated that state grid companies purchase from them. 
Wind power is the second largest category (by number) of Clean Development Mechanism projects 
in China (Mori, 2011), and this has helped the government recognize that wind power can bring 
economic and environmental benefits. This provided state-owned manufacturers with opportunities 
to acquire knowledge and gain economically (see Chapter 4 in this volume). Some of the 
manufacturers went further, acquiring technology licenses from second-tier foreign manufacturers 
who had lost in the competition in the European market and had therefore been willing to sell 
licenses at a cheaper price. These license agreements were used to establish joint ventures in 
exporting markets to scale up wind turbines and to develop ocean wind power. This has increased 
the production and export by Chinese manufacturers, and in 2010–11 they accounted for one 
quarter of world deliveries (Table 11-3). 
 
<Table 11-3 around here> 
 
As a result, globally, China hires the largest number of people in renewable-energy related 
industries. It is estimated that about 2.6 million people work in these industries in China, with 1.6 
million people working in solar PV and a further 350 thousand people working in wind power and 
solar heating/cooling during 2012–13 (RENS21, 2014). 
It was not until 2012, when the Japanese government implemented a FIT for renewable energy 
and mandated that existing electric power companies purchase all available renewable energy, that 
Japanese manufacturers recovered their share of solar PV delivery in the world market. Japanese 
manufacturers used to have the lion’s share of solar PV module sales and they have invested in 
efficiency improvements for solar PV, so some of them have the ability to reverse their decline in 
global market share, which is caused by slow expansion of the domestic market and fiercer 
competition in foreign markets. Nevertheless, China’s excessive supply of solar PV modules, 
coupled with uncertainty over policy changes, makes Japanese manufacturers hesitant to make 
huge investments in capacity expansion. Instead, they are investing in related goods such as power 
conditioners. 
Although no South Korean companies appear in the ranks of global leading wind turbine and 
solar PV manufacturers, the Korean government has created industrial parks to attract 
manufacturers to invest in polysilicon and silicon ingot production for export. This has resulted in 
creating top manufacturers in this field (Table 11-2). The government has also been pushing a few 
manufacturers, such as Samsung, to join the ocean wind turbine market as an entry point to a new 
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niche, as well as to increase the availability of appropriate renewable energy sources in South 
Korea. 
Taiwanese companies appear among the world’s leading solar PV cell manufacturers, as well as 
among the leading polysilicon manufacturers (Tables 11-4 and 11-2, respectively). This is due in 
part to the government’s prioritization of solar power through the applicable FIT, which reflects 
Taiwan’s strong foundation in semiconductor production (Lin, 2014). Other environmental 
industries have grown in Taiwan, but face difficulties in enhancing their international 
competitiveness due to constraints in the domestic and international markets (Chapter 6 in this 
volume). 
Such increases in production affect the trade balance. Japan has been a net exporter of renewable 
energy equipment since the early 1990s, and China and South Korea became net exporters in 2007 
and 2010, respectively (Chapter 5 in this volume). 
 
<Table 11-4 around here> 
 
1.2 Energy system transition for sustainability 
China and Japan have shown a significant increase in the installed capacity for wind and solar 
power. Figures 11-1 and 11-2 illustrate how rapidly the world has increased its supply of wind and 
solar power during the last decade. Among the listed countries, China has increased its capacity 
most dramatically. It has rapidly increased the annual installation rate for wind power, surpassing 
the installed capacity of Germany and the United States in 2010, when it had one third of the 
world’s installed capacity. China has improved its ranking on the installation of solar power since 
2011, having the second largest installed capacity in 2013. South Korea, too, has increased its 
installed capacity, but the scale and speed of improvement has been much more modest than in 
China. Japan used to have the largest installed capacity for solar power, but the country was left 
behind recently. This is attributed to the government failing to raise the share of mandatory 
purchase of renewable energy in the electricity generation market from 1 percent under its RPS. 
However, installed solar capacity in Japan has shown a significant increase in 2012-13 after the 
replacement of the RPS by a FIT, coupled with a purchase price high enough to allow independent 
power producers to earn a profit. In contrast to solar power, wind power use in Japan has increased 
only gradually, even after the Fukushima nuclear tragedy, which is reflective of its higher 
transaction costs. 
 
<Figure 11-1 and 11-2 around here> 
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Investments in renewable energy have increased power generation by renewable sources and 
their share in total power generation. China has raised that share rapidly since 2008, and Japan has 
done so since 2012, to reach 2 percent. South Korea and Taiwan have much lower shares, but in 
those countries the renewable energy share has still increased rapidly since 2010 (Table 11-5). 
 
<Table 11-5 around here> 
 
2. Challenges 
Despite the improvements described above, the share of renewable energy in total power 
generation still lags behind that in other Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, 
which are rich in geothermal power, and far behind the world-leading countries of Germany and 
Denmark. In addition, the speed of growth is varied. While China raised its renewable energy 
targets to accelerate installation of wind and solar PV, the South Korean government ended up 
extending the deadline for renewable energy targets from 2030 to 2035 in the 2014 National Basic 
Energy Plan. Japan has yet to set a renewable energy target, leaving the growth of installed capacity 
to market forces. 
In addition to wind and solar power’s higher relative costs, there are a number of barriers to 
widespread adoption of renewable electricity generation. The first barrier is the sporadic nature of 
renewable energy sources. Renewable energy of most types relies on variable power sources, and 
an enhanced grid is needed to balance supply and demand at the spot because supply is critically 
dependent on weather, while demand is not always. The wider the area covered by a distribution 
grid, the more flexibly its operator can balance supply and demand because it can combine 
heterogeneous demand and supply. Establishing such systems needs either investment in 
networking transmission lines or cross-regional coordination of transmission. Under the existing 
centralized and (regionally) monopolized production systems, incumbent power electricity 
companies should bear the investment costs and additional transaction costs of adjusting total 
supply, including volatile supply from renewable sources. However, existing companies have 
shown themselves unwilling to accept large amounts of renewable sources in their grids, and they 
refuse grid access by independent renewable power producers because that would deprive them of a 
source of profit. 
The second barrier to the growth of renewable energy is price regulation. In exchanges that 
allow a centralized regional monopoly on supply, the government keeps strict control on the retail 
energy and electricity price. Except in Japan, governments offer subsidized pricing for the sake of 
stabilizing people’s daily life, preventing inflation, and supporting industrial development. 
 Despite its heavy reliance on imported coal, South Korea has offered subsidies to the 
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agricultural sector and industrial energy customers in order to enhance their international 
competitiveness and protect them from foreign competition (Table 11-6). This policy has increased 
the presence of energy-intensive industries, such as steel and petrochemicals. The South Korean 
government kept electricity price stable during the periods of global energy hike (2007–08) and 
currency depreciation (2008–12). This resulted in the wholesale electricity price being lower than 
the price of imported oil, which generated excess demand that eventually resulted in the blackout of 
the Seoul metropolitan area in 2011. The policy has also widened the financial deficit of the 
state-owned Korean Electricity Power Company (KEPCO), which was US$ 2.75 billion in 2011 
(Duffield, 2014). This makes KEPCO incapable of investing in a grid and transmission system that 
could accept massive quantities of renewable electricity. 
 
<Table 11-6 around here> 
 
In China, tight price regulation by the government has deterred and curtailed grid connectivity, 
which has had an adverse impact on the spread of renewable electricity. In the meanwhile, China 
has refused grid companies’ requests to be allowed to pass on the additional costs to consumers. 
Coupled with an increased coal price, this restriction has deprived grid companies of the financial 
ability to invest in a unified power grid. Rapid installation of wind power poses additional 
challenges to grid connectivity in this context because grid companies are required to make huge 
investments to correct for the geographical imbalance between demand and supply, and the 
government does not sufficiently compensate this investment. In addition, grid companies must 
recover losses from paying premium prices to renewable power producers. Even though the 
Renewable Energy Law requires grid companies to accept increasing volumes of renewable energy, 
most local grids have refused to establish the necessary connections. The government has not 
strictly punished the grid companies for this refusal. Coupled with a prohibition against direct 
provision to end-users, and the numerous small-scale plants that had been installed for the purpose 
of rural electrification, refusal of grid connection left one-third of wind power plants unconnected 
to the grid (Fang et al., 2012). Although the rate of idled wind power capacity has dropped to 17 
percent in 2012 and to 11 percent in 2013, about 16 TWh were still wasted due to curtailment 
(REN21, 2014). 
Faced these difficulties, the Chinese government aims to shift the focus from large solar farms to 
rooftop PV as a way to increase smaller-scale distributed solar PV. These developments provide 
support for the perhaps optimistic view that idled or unconnected capacity is a temporary challenge 
that can be solved through future institutional changes and system innovations. 
The third barrier to the growth of renewable energy is nuclear dependency. Japan, South Korea, 
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and Taiwan are resource-poor countries that rely largely on foreign imports to meet their increasing 
energy demand. The two oil crises in the 1970s alerted these three countries to the degree of their 
vulnerability because of energy dependency, which prompted their governments to diversify energy 
sources. To enhance energy security and satisfy growing domestic demand, these countries have 
developed oil reserves, diversified their oil suppliers, which had been mostly Middle Eastern 
countries, and increased the number and capacity of nuclear power plants. In the process, 
centralized, monopolized nuclear and fossil fuel-based production systems were established and 
locked in. Japan implemented an electricity surcharge that was earmarked for local governments 
that hosted nuclear power plants. Taiwan decided to implement this surcharge several years later to 
accelerate nuclear development. The electric power companies, politicians at central and local 
governments, and ministries in charge of promotion and regulatory bodies have grown too close to 
one another to be truly independent, resulting in a system with insufficient transparency in 
decision-making and a lack of checks and balances. By 2000, nuclear power accounted for 
one-third of the total power generation in Japan and South Korea and one-sixth in Taiwan. 
Emerging concerns about climate change have spurred the development of nuclear power. South 
Korean has framed nuclear power as an energy source that can ensure greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions are reduced by the target amount, and as a new export industry. In the 2008 National 
Basic Energy Plan, the South Korean government set the nuclear share target at 59 percent in 2030, 
which is up from 33.6 percent in 2007. South Korea rushed to win a competition for the 
development of nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates and is seeking other 
opportunities. The Japanese government, after committing to a 25 percent reduction in GHG 
emissions by 2020, has framed nuclear and renewable energy as major vehicles to attain that target. 
In the 2010 Strategic Energy Plan, the government set the target for the share of renewable at 10 
percent of total primary energy by 2020, and that for renewable and nuclear energy at 70 percent of 
total power supply by 2030. Pushed by South Korea, Japan described the export of infrastructure, 
including nuclear power plants, as a priority in the 2010 Growth Strategy. 
The Fukushima nuclear tragedy has had significant effects on nuclear-based production systems 
in the region. For example, as a result of the tragedy coupled with a series of incidents and local 
opposition, South Korea lowered its nuclear target from 59 percent by 2030 to 22-29 percent by 
2035 in the 2014 National Basic Energy Plan. However, the plan keeps the nuclear capacity target 
intact. This implies that the government has no intention to compensate for the reduction by 
increasing renewable energy: rather, it intends to do this by increasing total generation capacity 
significantly.  
The Japanese government decided to suspend all nuclear power plants until they achieve 
compliance with more stringent safety standards and are certified by an independent regulatory 
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commission. In the meantime, it has attempted to change the decision-making process from one in 
which climate policy is subordinate to nuclear power development and strategic energy plans to an 
integrative process in which the government makes a joint decision regarding the above three plans, 
with a reflection of deliberative opinion polls (Chapter 3 in this volume). In reality, however, the 
government could not make this decision even at the cabinet level. The decision-making process 
reverted to its original form when a new administration took power. 
The fixed FIT offers an opportunity for renewable energy-rich areas to capitalize on this richness 
to develop local business, although the success of such attempts is critically dependent on 
institutional capacity (Chapter 2 in this volume). The ongoing unbundling of regional monopolies 
on vertically integrated supply in Japan is expected to strengthen institutions that are favorable to 
the development of a decentralized supply system. 
Taiwan, having grappled for a decade with the controversial development of its planned fourth 
nuclear power plant, has committed to a gradual decrease in nuclear power. It announced the 
phase-out of plants that have operated for 40 years and the replacement of its first power plant with 
the planned fourth plant if residents and local governments accept its operation. 
 
3. Side Effects in the Globalized World 
It is worth nothing that China and South Korea may have realized rapid growth in their 
renewable energy industries at the expense of other countries. 
 
3.1 Development of renewable energy industries in other countries 
Export is one of the key drivers of rapid growth in renewable energy industries. These industries 
enjoy economies of scale that make production more efficient while reducing costs, creating a 
comparative advantage in international trade. Thus, the bulk of employment in the sector is 
concentrated in a few countries, such as China, Brazil, the United States, India, Bangladesh, and 
some countries in the European Union (EU). This is true even in periods when growth in world 
demand leads to increased prices and profits. Overinvestment by Chinese manufacturers has placed 
downward pressure on prices since 2010, leading to cutthroat competition. Relative to the 2008 
peaks, wind turbine prices fell by as much as 20-25 percent in western markets and by more than 
35 percent in China before stabilizing in 2012 (REN21, 2013: 51). The cost of solar PVs from top 
Chinese manufacturers approached US$ 0.50 per Watt in 2013 (RENS21, 2014). 
This aggressive pricing from China, coupled with policy changes in several European countries, 
was highly detrimental to wind and solar manufacturers around the world, reducing their revenue 
margins so much that many have fallen into trouble (Table 11-7). For instance, Suzlon (India), the 
world’s seventh largest wind turbine deliverer in 2011, has lost money for four years running and 
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has struggled with massive debt. Some wind turbine manufactures in the United States have 
shuttered their factories due to a shortage of new turbine orders. German Q-Cells SE, formerly the 
world’s leading solar PV manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy. This has had an impact on green jobs. 
Italy was hit the hardest, with 70 percent of those employed in solar power companies losing their 
jobs. Germany, too, had 22 percent of its green industry workforce, 100,000 people, lose their jobs 
(IEA, 2013: 62). The larger share that China occupies in the world’s renewable energy equipment 
market, the greater the share that Japan loses in the global market (Chapter 5 in this volume). 
Chinese manufacturers have not been immune to the repercussions of price wars. Sinovel 
(China), which became the leading wind turbine manufacturer, put workers on involuntary leave. 
Many suppliers in China particularly have been pushed to the edge of collapse, with overcapacity 
pushing smaller manufacturers out of the market entirely. Suntech Power (China), which was the 
world’s largest solar PV deliverer, declared bankruptcy in 2013, which caused the loss of 200,000 
jobs in the solar PV sector in 2012 (IEA, 2013: 62). 
 
<Table 11-7 around here> 
 
Despite these casualties, three Chinese companies remain listed in the global top ten of wind 
turbine manufacturers, and six in the global top ten of solar PV module manufacturers (Tables 11-3 
and 11-1, respectively). 
By replacing the FIT with an RPS, South Korea is expecting to limit the impact of imported 
low-price, low-quality renewable energy equipment. An RPS allows Korean electric power 
companies to procure equipment at their discretion, and so they can implicitly prioritize solar 
modules that are made of cells, wafers, and polysilicons produced by Korean manufacturers. 
 
3.2 Eco-efficiency in resource use 
As discussed in the introduction to this book, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific defines green growth as the eco-efficiency of economic 
growth (UNESCAP, 2008). South Korea has enhanced its eco-efficiency through international and 
domestic reuse and recycling of end-of-use goods. South Korea had implemented a waste deposit 
system to reduce emissions and enhance recycling when faced with the so-called “not in my 
backyard” syndrome for developing a waste disposal site. However, associations of Korean 
industrial companies strongly opposed it, citing its high costs. In response, the government replaced 
this plan with the Extended Producer’s Responsibility (EPR) program. Although imposing on 
manufacturers the obligation to attain a recycling target for end-of-use electric appliances, it offered 
export subsidies for international recycling as a complementary measure. This measure may result 
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in the creation of pollution havens impacts at export destinations where environmental governance 
is too weak to prevent environmental pollution from the recycling and disposal process. In the case 
of lead-containing used televisions and computer monitors, Korean manufacturers save recycling 
costs and Korean society gains the benefit of saving on disposal site costs, while Vietnam, the 
major export destination, gains little from legally permitted reuse (Chapter 8 in this volume). 
Product-related environmental regulations (PRERs) can be policy responses to avoid such 
environmental pollution in countries of weak enforcement. PRERs require significant or complete 
reduction of hazardous substances that are contained in a product. Nonetheless, PRERs have not 
always functioned effectively to advance cleaner production and products in such countries, 
primarily because the use of PRERs has not created globally unified regulations and standards. As a 
result, several East Asian countries have taken industrial benefits into account when implementing 
their own PRERs, while others have suffered from a massive influx of ‘dirty’ products that do not 
comply with the PRERs of developed countries (Chapter 9 in this volume). 
 
4. A Model Worth Spreading Globally? 
4.1 Leapfrogging in renewable energy industry 
At first glance, it looks easier for developing countries to realize leapfrogging in the wind and 
solar PV industries. A company can capitalize on production modules to assemble parts, 
components, and material resources even if it lacks the capacity for a complex production process 
and has few skilled workers. Because the industry has been previously established in developed 
countries, some suppliers of machinery and equipment offer a series of production line coupled 
with operational know-how. This enables manufacturers in any country to enhance production 
capacity so long as they have a certain amount of capital and educated laborers. 
However, companies face difficulties in enhancing efficiency and in upgrading quality by 
themselves. It was not until they purchased a branch of bankrupted European manufacturers that 
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers could compete with foreign competitors in the global market. 
The Chinese government has played a significant role in fostering domestic manufacturers and 
protecting them from foreign competition. It capitalized on requirements for local content to the 
benefit of domestic, state-owned wind power companies. As a precondition to obtain a wind power 
concession, the government imposed a requirement for 50 percent local contents in 2004, and this 
requirement was raised to 70 percent in 2005. In contrast, companies were nearly exempt from 
requirements relating to track record or lifetime turbine performance. State-owned companies 
capitalized on better relations with the government and state-owned banks to ensure access to 
substantial amounts of state funding, even while enjoying no or limited responsibility to 
shareholders. This enabled them to invest in less-profitable projects (Buen and Castro, 2012). In 
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addition, state-owned companies were able to acquire licenses from second-tier foreign 
manufacturers that had lost in the competition in the European market and were willing to sell 
licenses at a less expensive price. Under these conditions, private sector and foreign investors won 
less than 10 percent of the concessions (Li et al, 2010). The winners in the concession are able to 
obtain financial support for grid connection and access roads as well as preferential loan and tax 
conditions, which have enabled domestic manufacturers to make massive investment, seeking 
economies of scale. When the government lifted the local content requirements in 2009, it was 
confident that domestic manufacturers had become competitive enough to compete with foreign 
companies. Although Chinese companies had to accept restrictive terms imposed by foreign 
companies when acquiring licenses, for example, restricting or prohibiting export of the technology 
or offering licenses for only turbines below 1.5 MW capacity, they have a first-mover advantage in 
adapting them to local conditions. In fact, the share of Chinese manufacturers in the Chinese 
market has increased by 27 percent from 2007 to 2013, when it exceeded 93 percent, and European 
turbine manufacturers have experienced a decline (REN21, 2014: 58). 
It was not just the central government that fostered domestic manufacturers. Local governments 
have provided land grants and subsidies as measures to boost the local economy. The state 
Communist party evaluates the leaders of local governments according to economic performance 
during their tenure when deciding on promotions. This process makes it rational for local 
governments to take targeted policies toward prominent companies under their jurisdiction. This 
holds true for private companies that have a close relationship with the area. 
The Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has provided a massive amount of subsidized loans to 
private solar PV manufacturers that sought the help of foreign investment banks due to a lack of 
access to preferential treatment or financial support from the central government. CDB subsidized 
loans of US$ 14.7 billion to clean energy projects and other energy saving projects. In comparison, 
the European Investment Bank provided 8 billion euros (approx. US$ 10.6 billion) and the US 
Federal Financing Bank provided US$ 2.12 billion (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013: 151). Most of 
the Chinese companies listed in the global top ten manufacturers of wind turbines and solar PV 
modules obtained huge credit lines from CDB. The CDB lines of credit had a cowbell effect by 
providing a guarantee that made commercial banks feel safer lending to these companies, which 
allowed the companies to obtain cheaper working capital loans from commercial banks. Such loans 
allowed them to further expand capacity and to drive marginal production costs down. 
Local governments and the CDB even rescued these companies when they got into deep distress 
during 2010-11. The government of Xinyu city, where the company LDK is based, paid a portion of 
the company’s debt. Yingli sold 1.5 billion yuan (approx. US$ 242 million) of bonds in 2012, with 
CDB as the lead underwriter (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013: 154) after it suffered from an annual 
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net loss of more than 50 million yuan (approx. US$ 8.1 million). This government funding has 
enabled companies to survive in the global market amid plunging prices. CDB went further, 
providing credit lines that enabled Yingli to purchase a subsidiary of the bankrupted Q-Cells and 
take a stake in Sunways AG, a German solar panel and cell manufacturer (Sanderson and Forsythe, 
2013: 156). 
Few countries have local governments and state development banks that can provide such 
massive financial resources for targeted industries. Besides, massive financial supports have caused 
trade wars with leading countries. The defaults of US Solyndra and German Q-Cells SE triggered 
investigation of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy remedies. The United States announced 
anti-dumping duties of roughly 31 percent on Chinese PV equipment in May 2012, and the EU 
adopted an average 47.7 percent duty in December 2013. The United States also announced an 
anti-dumping tariff averaging 25 percent for PV cells and modules produced in Taiwan in August 
2014. Australia announced that it was launching an anti-dumping investigation on finished and 
semi-finished Chinese PV module imports in May 2014. 
 
4.2 Leapfrogging in energy transition for sustainability 
Although centralized, monopolistic nuclear and fossil fuel-based systems for providing 
electricity have blocked South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan from increasing the use of renewable 
energy, China has increased its use of renewable energy and reduced its coal dependency, 
advancing hybridization of its energy infrastructure. Can China be a global model for energy 
transition for sustainability, and, in particular, do its experiences provide useful lessons for 
developing countries? 
At this moment, the answer seems to be no. First, the growth of solar use in China is in part a 
consequence of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties imposed on solar PV modules by the 
United States and the EU. The Chinese government intends to exploit the domestic market to 
compensate Chinese PV module manufacturers for financial losses resulting from the duties as well 
as the reduction in the size of the European market. China expects that such measures will direct 
companies to increase the use of Chinese solar cells and polysilicon. Among developing countries, 
only India and Brazil have markets big enough to take this approach and keep a competitive 
environment in the domestic market, which eventually offers an internationally competitive price 
for renewable energy supply. 
Second, it is by massively increasing oil and gas imports that China has been able to reduce its 
coal dependency and emissions of carbon and other air pollutants. To ensure energy access and 
energy security, China has mobilized massive subsidized loans to oil and gas rich countries that are 
not locked up by Western countries, ranging from South Sudan and Angola in Africa, to Myanmar, 
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Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, and to Russia. It is unlikely that other energy 
importing countries have a foreign reserve large enough that the government and/or state banks can 
mobilize the funds needed to enhance energy security in the way that China has. Some energy-rich 
countries have launched energy-saving measures and renewable energy initiatives to prepare for 
anticipated energy shortfalls in the future, but many countries still have little incentive to widely 
adopt renewable energy (Chapter 10 in this volume). 
 
4.3 Enhancing transition to sustainable development 
Although green growth and low-carbon development strategy have increased employment in the 
renewable energy sector in China and, to a lesser extent, in South Korea, they have contributed 
little, if any, to other dimensions of social sustainability. Instead, local governments in China and 
the CDB have mobilized massive financial resources at the cost of broadening the income gap and 
social divide. Companies have used agricultural land and bond issuances to obtain financial 
resources. This has resulted in capital gains from the development of economic infrastructure near 
the affected land and the conversion of agricultural land to urban development. In the process, an 
increasing number of local governments have developed local financial corporations that receive 
CDB loans and use these to grab lands from farmers, and these funds are spent without audit or 
oversight. They have forcefully relocated farmers, offering only meager compensation, and this has 
increased social unrest around China (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013: 21). In South Korea, a small 
number of conglomerates have benefited from the renewable energy industry but a large number of 
small companies have not, and there has been no notable effect on the rising unemployment of the 
younger generation. 
Unlike in Northeast Asia, people in Central and South American countries demand a framework 
of social institutions that nurture and assist people (Dujon, 2009). Residents of these countries have 
long suffered from economic, social, and political marginalization under neoliberal market policies. 
Grassroots movements have raised consciousness about the connections among economic survival, 
environmental protection, and social justice, and these movements have attempted to democratize 
the state to redefine the path to social well-being and force the state to increase provisions for broad 
social well-being (Dujon, 2009). 
Because of the very different contexts, it is understandable that Central and South American 
countries have criticized green growth as not contributing to social well-being, and refused to make 
it a global goal at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)1. To be a globally 
acceptable agenda, green growth should at least be supplemented by an inclusive growth approach 
                                                 
1 Chung, Rae Kwon. Presentation at the expert meeting on green growth and sustainable 
development, Sapporo, Japan, 22 August 2013. 
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that focuses on a just distribution of resources and on human development2. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Northeast Asian countries have capitalized on their existing industrial bases to adopt a green 
industrial policy in the face of the global financial crisis. They have focused on renewable-energy 
equipment industries, such as wind turbine, solar PV cell, and module manufacturing because 
manufacturers can capitalize on production modules to assemble parts, components, and material 
resources without needing a complex production process or a mature labor force. The Chinese 
government and, to a lesser extent, the South Korean government have selectively intervened to 
foster domestic manufacturers in this industry. Coupled with technological transfer from foreign 
equipment suppliers, such intervention has created an incentive for many manufacturers to join the 
market, which has resulted in overinvestment in a limited number of renewable energy equipment 
types and to price collapses. Although China has avoided inefficient production by the use of 
protection measures, this has sparked a trade war with the United States and leading countries in 
Europe. Although lower prices for renewable-energy equipment may accelerate a transition to 
energy sustainability, the incumbent centralized, monopolistic nuclear- and fossil fuel-based energy 
production systems have blocked such transitions in Northeast Asia. 
Northeast Asian countries have legislated recycling acts to increase the eco-efficiency of 
resource use, but this has had the effect of increasing the international trade in end-of-life goods. 
These acts have been criticized for transferring environmental pollution to importing countries with 
weak governance. Import regulations in China and Vietnam, as well as PRERs implemented in 
many countries, might have mitigated the adverse impacts, but South Korea still promotes the 
export of end-of-life goods. 
Overall, a green growth and low-carbon development strategy has succeeded in reframing 
policies on climate and the environment as industrial policies and in rapidly increasing the 
production and spread of renewable energy equipment in a limited number of countries. The 
benefits from approaches have been concentrated on a few industries and manufacturers, while the 
costs have spread across society and to other countries. To advance the global transition to 
sustainable development, green growth and low-carbon development strategy should be 
implemented in a way that breaks institutional lock-in, which has blocked such a transition, that 
minimizes the side effects of change, and that incorporates human development and social 
well-being. 
 
                                                 
2 The World Bank (2012) adopts the concept of inclusive green growth, paying attention to 
reduction of poverty and improvement of access to health, education, and infrastructure services. 
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Figure 11-1 Cumulative Wind Power Installation by Country (MW) 
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Figure 11-2 Cumulative Solar Power Installation by Country (MW) 
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Global Market Share (%) 
2011 2012 2013 
1 (3) Yingli (China) 2300 4.8 6.7 8.2 
2 (2) First Solar (USA) 1800 5.7 5.3 4.2 
3 (4) Trina Solar (China) 1650 4.3 4.7 6.7 
4 (1) Suntech (China) 1650 5.8 4.7 - 
5 (5) Canadian Solar (China) 1600 4.0 4.6 4.9 
6 (7) Sharp (Japan) 1050 2.8 3.0 5.4 
7 (11) JA Solar (China) 994 2.4 2.8 3.2 
8 (12) Jinko Solar (China) 923 2.3 2.6 4.6 
9 (6) SunPower (USA) 912 2.8 2.6 - 
10 (10) Hereon Solar (China) 888 2.5 2.5 - 
10 (8) Hanwha SolarOne (Korea) 750 2.7 2.5 3.3 
12 (14) Kyocera (Japan) 746 1.9 2.1 3.1 
Note 1: Figures in parenthesis show performance in 2011. 
Note 2: Based on 35.5GW produced in 2012 and 38.7GW in 2013. 
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Table 11-2 Global Top Ten Polysilicon Manufactures in 2011 
Rank Company Capacity (tons) 
1 GCL (China) 65,000 
2 OCI (Korea) 65,000 
3 Hemlock (USA) 43,000 
4 Wacker (Germany) 33,000 
5 LDK (China) 25,000 
6 REC Group (Norway) 19,000 
7 MEMC (USA) 15,000 
8 Tokuyama (Japan) 9,200 
9 LCY (Taiwan) 8,000 
10 Woonglin (Korea) 5,000 
Source: 
http://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2013/04/top-10-solar-pv-module-suppliers-of-2012/ 
(accessed July 29 2013). 
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Global Market Share (%) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Vestas (Demark) 5,211 4,850 14.8 12.7 14.0 13.1 
2 Sinovel Wind (China) 3,700 - 11.1 9.0 3.2 - 
3 Goldwind (China) 3,584 3,600 9.5 8.7 6.0 11.0 
4 Gamesa (Spain) 3,308 1,951 6.6 8.0 6.1 5.5 
5 ENERCON (Germany) 3,203 3,657 7.2 7.8 8.2 9.8 
6 GE Energy (USA) 3,170 2,342 9.6 7.7 15.5 6.6 
7 Suzlon (India) 3,116 2,239 6.9 7.6 7.4 5.3 
8 
Guodian United Power 
(China) 
3,042 1,419 4.2 7.4 4.7 4.0 
9 Siemens (Germany) 2,591 2,587 5.9 6.3 9.5 7.4 
10 
Minyang Wind Power 
(China) 
1,500 1,242 - 3.6 2.7 3.5 
Note: Figures in parenthesis show performance in 2011. 
Source: Author compilation in reference to REN21 (2013; 2014) and  
http://www.cleantechinvestor.com/portal/wind-energy/10502-wind-turbine-manufacturers-global-m
arket-shares.html (accessed July 29 2013). 
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Table 11-4 Global Top Ten Solar Cell Manufacturers by Capacity in 2011 
Rank Company Capacity (tons) 
1 Suntech (China) 2,400 
2 JA Solar (China) 2,100 
3 Trina Solar (China) 1,900 
4 Yingli (China) 1,700 
5 Motech Solar (Taiwan) 1,500 
6 Gintech (Taiwan) 1,500 
7 Canadian Solar (China) 1,300 
8 Neo Solar Power (Taiwan) 1,300 
9 Hanwha SolarOne (Korea) 1,100 
10 Jinko Solar (China) 1,100 
Source: http://energydeals.wordpress.com/2011/12/24/list-of-solar-companies/ 
http://pv.energytrend.com/research/20140129-6134.html (last accessed August 22, 2014). 
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Table 11-5 Share of Renewable in Electricity Generation 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
South Korea 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.31 0.40 0.90 1.53 1.69 
China 0.05 0.26 0.19 0.34 0.67 1.24 1.88 1.91 2.62 
Japan 0.60 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.10 1.14 1.39 1.64 
Taiwan 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.24 0.29 0.45 0.47 0.74 N.A. 
Philippines 25.65 17.51 18.52 17.22 18.08 16.79 14.78 N.A. N.A. 
Indonesia 2.66 5.18 5.00 4.94 5.55 5.86 5.86 N.A. N.A. 
Note: Taiwan includes only wind and solar power, while others include geothermal, biomass and 
waste power. 
Source: Author compilation from the information in Japan Electric Power Information Center 
(2012); China Statistical Press (2013); Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Japan (2014a; 
2014b); United Nations (2013); Taiwan Power Corporation (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012), 
and Korean Energy Statistics Information System 
http://www.kesis.net/flexapp/KesisFlexApp.jsp?menuId=Q0109&reportId=&chk=Y (accessed on 
August 21, 2014). 
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Table 11-6 Recovery rate of electricity price by sector in South Korea in 2007 







Source: Author compilation from Jones, R. S. and B. Yoo (2011). 
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Canadian Solar -3.9 0.10 
Jinko -20.8 0.13 
JA Solar -33.3 0.06 
Hanwha SolarOne -36.4 0.03 
ReneSola -39.0 -0.02 
Trina -63.7 0.02 
Yingli -103.4 0.04 
Source: ‘Canadian solar’s 1Q13 financial result evaluation: Rise in gross margin lead to decrease in 
loss,’ Energy Trend July 4, 2013. http://pv.energytrend.com/research/20130704-5379.html 
(accessed July 24 2013). 
